Ryanair engine failure over Greece - What we know so far
- Av Geek Blog
- 11 minutes ago
- 13 min read
On 10 July 2026 Ryanair flight 1879 (operated by Malta Air), from Thessaloniki, Greece, to Memmingen, Germany, operated by a Boeing 737-8AS aircraft experienced an uncontained engine failure as it was climbing out from Thessaloniki. Debris destroyed a cabin window, causing a rapid decompression. The aircraft returned to Thessaloniki where it landed safely.
In this blog post I will take a look at what we know so far about this event. I will examine what the preliminary report details and what it could mean for the investigation going forward.
Please note that this information is preliminary and subject to change.
Brief Overview
Date: 10 July 2026
Time: 06:21 local time (03:21 UTC)
Flight: Ryanair flight 1879
Airline: Malta Air, doing business as Ryanair
Aircraft Type: Boeing 737-8AS
Aircraft Registration: 9H-QEU
Departure: Thessaloniki International Airport (SKG), Thessaloniki, Greece
Scheduled Arrival: Memmingen Airport (FMM), Memmingen, Germany
Accident: Aircraft experienced an uncontained engine failure and rapid decompression. (Aircraft experienced an engine fan-blade-out failure on departure)
What happened - from Preliminary Report
The flight from Greece to Germany was a scheduled international passenger flight with 2 pilots, 4 cabin crew and 149 passengers (including one lap child) on board.
According to the fight crew, while climbing through an altitude of about 16,000 feet, about 4.5 nautical miles south of the Greek border with North Macedonia, they received a number 2 engine high vibration indication. The crew reduced engine power and started the Engine High Vibration non-normal checklist. Shortly after, the engine vibration indication was reduced and the crew continued the climb on autopilot.
However, the engine vibrations then significantly increased and the crew heard a loud bang and the autopilot was disengaged. While assessing the engine condition, the cabin altitude warning sounded. The flight crew put on their oxygen masks, declared an emergency and began an immediate descent.
The flight attendants, who were preparing for cabin service, reported hearing and feeling a loud continuous vibration and seeing a small amount of fog/smoke before the oxygen masks dropped. One flight attendant reported hearing an automated public address system announcement saying "emergency descent" while another flight attendant recalled manually making another decompression announcement.
The flight attendants recalled that passengers had donned their oxygen masks. Flight attendants 2 and 4 initially sat down in the forward jump seats and put on their oxygen masks, however flight attendant 4 moved to the galley to use another mask after the one above the jump seat detached from the overhead.
Flight attendant 1 noticed that some passengers were standing up and asking for help and responded to assist. The flight attendant noticed that the passenger in seat 11F was partially lodged in a damaged cabin window, and that the entire window was missing. Other passengers were assisting and managed to pull the injured passenger back into the cabin. The flight attendant then sat in seat 11B and put on an oxygen mask. However, the mask became detached and the flight attendant used a different one.
A passenger went to the forward galley and asked flight attendants 2 and 4 for something heavy and metal to try and block the broken cabin window hole and retrieved a metal box to bring back to row 11.
The injured passenger was moved to row 12 and was attended to by a passenger who was a doctor for the remainder of the flight. The doctor asked for a first aid kit and equipment, and flight attendant 1 retrieved the forward first aid kit.
The flight attendants communicated with the flight deck and confirmed the flight crew were ok. The cabin crew were informed of the engine failure, the decompression and the intent to return to Thessaloniki with an estimated time of 20 minutes.
The flight attendants received instructions to secure the cabin, which they did. The flight crew later informed them that oxygen masks were no longer needed.
After descending below 10,000 feet, the flight crew secured the number 2 engine and returned to Thessaloniki uneventfully. The airplane remained on the runway for an inspection and then proceeded to the gate, where first responders were waiting. One passenger sustained serious injuries.
The accident was originally believed to have taken place in the airspace over North Macedonia, but it was discovered that the event occurred in Greece airspace. On 16 July 2026, The Greece Hellenic Air and Railway Safety Investigation Authority delegated the investigation in full to the NTSB.
The preliminary report states that the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and Flight Data Recorder (FDR) were sent to NTSB headquarters for download. The preliminary report also states that the materials engineer travelled to France to lead the engine fan blade examination.
Crew Experience
The preliminary report states that the captain was hired by Malta Air in May 2025. He had a total of 8,270 flight hours, 7,683 of which were in the same make and model as the accident aircraft.
The first officer was hired by Malta Air in March 2023. He had a total of 2,523 flight hours, 2,333 of which were in the same make and model as the accident airplane.
Aircraft Examination
Examination of the airplane revealed that the number 2 (right) engine, a CFM International CFM56-7B26, experienced a fan blade separation that resulted in engine fragments striking the fuselage and the right horizontal stabilizer.
The pressurized section of the fuselage was penetrated through the row 11 passenger cabin window, as well as through the lower lobe fuselage skin behind the right wing to body fairing. Additional impact damage was found on the right wing-to-body fairing. Additional impact damage included: a dent with paint smearing on the fuselage window belt skin, a dent on a stringer common to the dented fuselage window belt skin, a gouge on the right horizontal stabilizer upper skin and a dent on the right horizontal stabilizer leading edge.
Examination of the engine and nacelle revealed that the number 10 fan blade had fractured and separated below the blade platform. The outer blade tips were fractured and separated on fan blade numbers 16 and 21. All of the remaining fan blades were full length but displayed different levels of impact deformation. The preliminary report states that three loose fan blades were recovered from the engine.
A visual examination of the core was performed and the preliminary report states that there was no evidence of radical uncontainment. The engine inlet cowl exhibited evidence of punctures. The inlet and fan cowling remained attached to the engine. The inlet cowl barrel exhibited impact damage, tearing and/or missing material from the three O'clock to the six O'clock positions as viewed from the rear. The inlet lip skin had a scrape mark at about the seven O'clock position.
The inlet cowl outer barrel had a radical penetration forward of the fan plane of rotation at the 9:30 position that measured about 14 inches circumferentially by 10 inches axially. A second inlet cowl tear and puncture were present forward of the fan plane of rotation at the seven O'clock position that measured approximately 13 inches circumferentially by 10 inches axially.
Several of the aft bulkhead splice fasteners failed at the nine O'clock, six O'clock and three O'clock positions. The attach ring to the aft bulkhead fasteners failed at 360 degrees circumferentially and loose rivet tails were observed along the bottom of the inner barrel. The preliminary report states that enhancements for fasteners, defined in Federal Aviation Administration Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2025-04-01, had not yet been incorporated on this inlet cowl hardware.
The inboard fan cowl sustained skin damage near the integrated drive generator (IDG) oil access door and the number one forward fan cowl latch was found disengaged. The gap between the inboard fan cowl and thrust reverser was reduced at the bottom of the interface with contact observed at the forward edge of the thrust reverser. The preliminary report states that enhancements for fasteners and an external doubler, defined in AD 2025-04-02, had not yet been incorporated on this fan cowl hardware.
The preliminary report states that bird remains, including feathers, were recovered from the forward face of the IDG oil cover, one of the thrust reverser blocker door drag links, and the six O'clock position of the engine fan case near the thrust reverser split flange. The report states that the remains, along with the samples from the fan blades were hand carried to the Smithsonian Institution Feather Identification Lab in Washington D.C. for examination.
The report states that the exhaust nozzle remained attached to the engine. There was cracking and 360 degree sheer buckling on the exhaust case immediately aft of the engine turbine near frame. The preliminary report states that enhancements for installing additional brackets for the exhaust nozzle, defined in AD 2025-04-03, had not been incorporated on this exhaust nozzle hardware.
The preliminary report highlights that the FAA compliance date for all three of these airworthiness directives is July 2028.
Fan Blades Examination
Pieces from the fractured number 10 fan blade, the remaining 23 fan blades, and associated shims, spacers and platforms were sent to Safran Aircraft Engines in France for a group examination which was led by the Chief Technical Advisor for the NTSB Materials Laboratory.
The number 10 fan blade was fractured through the dovetail in the blade route. A portion of the fracture surface covering approximately 37% of the total fracture surface had relatively smooth features with a curving boundary, features consistent with fatigue. The fracture features were traced back to an origin area on the concave side of the blade near the trailing edge.
At the fatigue origin area located about 0.559 inches away from the root end face, ratchet marks were observed, consistent with multiple origins along an axial length of about 0.650 inches. Heavy fretting damage was observed locally at the dovetail contact face adjacent to the origin area and in the same area on both sides of the associated shims.
The preliminary report states that the fracture surface on the number 10 fan blade dovetail piece was examined using a scanning electron microscope. The origin areas were damaged from fracture surface recontact and rubbing. However, fatigue striations were observed across the fatigue region from 0.008 inches deep to the boundary at a depth of 0.626 inches.
The preliminary report further states that the striation spacing was relatively course and unchanged throughout the fatigue region, consistent with fracture due to high amplitude fatigue (HAF). The preliminary report states that in aircraft engine fan blade fractures, high amplitude fatigue is associated with cyclic loading that occurs at frequencies greater than a flight cycle and at stress amplitudes that are larger than those typically associated with high-cycle fatigue.
The preliminary report also states that the number 10 spacer exhibited an area of elastomer deterioration near the trailing edge end.
Visual examinations were also completed on the remaining 23 fan blades. Fan blade numbers 8, 9, 12 and 21 had rounded deformation of the leading edges. The blades were further examined for evidence of organic material transfer using black light. Samples of fluorescing material were collected from blade numbers 9, 11, 12, 20, and 21 as well as an airfoil fragment from blade 10.
Recorders
An initial review of the quick access recorder data revealed that several evolutions of vibrations were detected by two sensors (one of which was located at bearing number 1 while the other was located on the fan frame compressor case) for the number 2 engine during takeoff and climb. Vibration values for the fan frame compressor case (FFCC) sensor were higher than the bearing number 1 sensor during these phases.
The first was a sudden increase simultaneously from both sensors near the end of the takeoff roll. The FFCC value increased from about 0.2 Cockpit Units (CU) to 1.7 CU before the airplane lifted off. The vibration value then rose from 1.7 CU to 2.0 CU over the next 175 seconds. The rate of vibration change then increased, and the values rose from 2.0 CU to 4.3 CU over the next 250 seconds, until the engine power was reduced. As the power reduced, the vibration value decreased to about 1.2 CU. As the power was subsequently increased, the level rose first from 1.2 CU to 2.2 CU, then from 2.2 CU to the maximum recording limit of 5 CU within 19 seconds.
The preliminary report states that the Honeywell Solid State Flight Data Recorder readout is in progress at the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory.
The preliminary report also states that the aircraft was equipped with a Honeywell Solid State Cockpit Voice Recorder that recorded the last two hours of aircraft operation across four channels. The event flight was about 57 minutes in duration and was captured in its entirety. Both English and Greek were spoken by the flight crew during the flight. Some cockpit discussions were not discernable because they were obscured by simultaneous radio transmissions.
About 7 and a half minutes after the start of the takeoff roll, the crew called for the high engine vibration non-normal checklist, noting that the vibration level was 4.3. No aural alert was audible on the CVR. A loud bang sound was recorded about 9 minutes and 20 seconds after the start of the takeoff roll.
The number 2 electronic engine control (EEC) unit and the airborne vibration monitor (AVM) unit were retained for data downloads at a later date.
Maintenance Records
The preliminary report states that a review of maintenance records for the engine revealed that the fan blades had undergone ultrasonic inspections in accordance with CFM service bulletin (SB) 72-1033 revision 3, on 11 November 2025, and more recently on 24 May 2026, 253 cycles before the accident flight with no findings. It prescribes initial and recurring ultrasonic inspections of the concave and convex side of the fan blade dovetail, for any indications of crack development. The service bulletin was originally issued in 2018 after a fan-blade-out (FBO) event in which a passenger was fatally injured.
The preliminary report also states that four suspected bird strikes to the accident airplane's number 2 engine were reported by flight crews in the 12 months before the accident. No damage was found in the subsequent maintenance actions. Bird remains were reportedly found in two of the cases.
Cabin Examination
Examination of the airplane cabin revealed that the only emergency equipment found opened and used was a first aid kit found on seat 12F. All oxygen masks were found to be deployed.
The forward flight attendant seat restraints were found all buckled and aft flight attendant seat restraints were found unbuckled. All galley bins located in the forward and aft R1 were found stowed. Some of the locks and latches on the galley carts and bins were found in the unlatched position. The metal box mentioned in the flight attendant statement was found in the R1 aft galley, inboard second to the top compartment with no noticeable damage.
Middle and outer passenger window pane shards were found in the cabin between passenger rows 8 and 15. The interior sidewall panel surrounding the damaged passenger window at row 11, had a fracture at the lower aft vertical edge of the window that extended aft to the nearest fuselage frame aft of the window edge.
Additional Investigation Notes
The preliminary report notes that the number 2 engine, along with its inlet, the number 1 engine fan blades, shims and spacers, and the row 11 passenger window forging were retained for the investigation.
The preliminary report also states that the investigative team is aware of previous FBO events with similar engine models that resulted in damage to engine inlets or cowlings and fuselage structures. However, determination of any relevant similarities or details between the two events remains under investigation.
The preliminary report notes that the investigation is ongoing.
About the Boeing 737
The Boeing 737 is a narrow body aircraft made by Boeing. Originally envisioned in 1964, the initial 737-100 took its first flight in April 1967 and entered service in February 1968 with Lufthansa.
Since its launch, multiple variants of the aircraft have been developed, including: the first generation Boeing 737 (the 737-100, 737-200), the second generation Boeing 737 (the 737-300, 737-400, 737-500), the third generation, also called the 737NG (737-600, 737-700, 737-800, 737-900), and the fourth generation, the 737 MAX (737 MAX 7, 737 MAX 8, 737 MAX 9, and 737 MAX 10).
The aircraft has also been modified with special variants including: private jets, freighters, surveillance aircraft, Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, anti-submarine aircraft, other military versions and more.
As of June 2026, 17,497 Boeing 737s have been ordered and 12,615 delivered. The Boeing 737 was the best selling commercial aircraft until it was overtaken by the Airbus A320 family in October 2019.
About Ryanair
Ryanair is an Irish ultra-low-cost carrier that was founded in 1984 and is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland. It is the largest airline in Europe by scheduled passengers carried, fleet size and total flights. In 2025 the company sold 208 million airline tickets. The parent company, Ryanair Holdings Plc, operates airline subsidiaries Ryanair DAC, Buzz, Malta Air, Lauda Europe, and Ryanair UK. Combined, the group manages a fleet of 651 aircraft and operates over 3,500 short-haul flights per day, serving approximately 230 airports in 36 countries.
About Malta Air
Malta Air is a low-cost airline that operates from Malta. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ryanair Holdings and the airline operates scheduled flights on behalf of Ryanair. The airline was founded in 2019 as a joint venture between Ryanair and the government of Malta. In 2025, Ryanair acquired full ownership of the airline after purchasing the Maltese government's remaining share.
Similar Events
There have been several other aviation accidents that appear, at least on the surface, to be similar to this event. However whether or not there is an official link between the events has not been determined.
On 27 August 2016, Southwest Airlines flight 3472, a Boeing 737-700, flying from New Orleans to Orlando, experienced a engine failure while climbing through 31,000 feet. A fan blade in the engine broke due to a fatigue crack. Debris from the damaged engine inlet punctured the fuselage resulting in a loss of cabin pressure. Oxygen masks were deployed while the crew initiated an emergency descent to 10,000 feet. The aircraft diverted to Pensacola International Airport where it landed safely. There were no injuries.
On 17 April 2018, Southwest Airlines flight 1380, a Boeing 737-700, flying from LaGuardia, New York to Dallas Love Field, Texas, experienced an engine failure over Pennsylvania. The engine cowl had broken in the failure and cowl fragments damaged the fuselage, bursting a cabin window and causing an explosive depressurization. The pilots descended and diverted to Philadelphia International Airport. One passenger was partially ejected from the aircraft and died, while eight others sustained minor injuries.
Clearly the investigation has already uncovered a lot of information which I am sure will be helpful in determining the cause of this accident. It will be interesting to see whether or not the investigation officially links this accident event with any of the other events discussed above which appear, at least on the surface, to be similar.
What do you think about this accident? Was there anything about it, or the investigation that surprised you? Feel free to share your thoughts by leaving a comment below, sharing on the group discussion page, or by posting on social media. You can also get in contact with us by using the contact form or by email.
Be sure to check out the official preliminary report, as it includes some interesting photos of the accident aircraft.
Further Reading*
The following link is provided for informational purposes only. I am not responsible for the content, accuracy, or practices of external websites.
NTSB Preliminary Report - Ryanair uncontained engine failure followed by cabin depressurization and passenger window injury
Don't forget to follow Av Geek Blog on social media, or subscribe to our email newsletter so you won't miss the latest updates from us.
Thank you for reading.
X: avgeek_blog
Instagram: avgeek_blog
Email: geekofairlines@gmail.com
Date published: 22 August 2026
*If you would like your content added or removed from this page, please contact me.
Comments