Air Canada CRJ LaGuardia collision - what we know so far
- Av Geek Blog
- 2 days ago
- 15 min read
On 22 March 2026, a Jazz Aviation CRJ-900, operating as Air Canada Express flight 8646, collided with an airport firefighting vehicle on the runway while landing at LaGuardia airport. The Captain and First Officer were killed and two serious injuries were reported.
The NTSB has now released their preliminary report and in this blog post I take a look at what we know so far about this accident, largely based on the preliminary report. I examine what the preliminary report details as well as the aftermath of this accident, including actions the FAA is taking in order to prevent an accident like this from happening again.
Please note that this information is preliminary and subject to change.
All times are local times (Eastern Daylight Time).
Brief summary
Date: 22 March 2026
Time: 23:37 Eastern Daylight Time
Flight: Jazz Aviation flight 646 / Air Canada flight 8646
Airline: Jazz Aviation operating on behalf of Air Canada
Aircraft Type: Mitsubishi CL-600 [CRJ-900]
Aircraft registration: C-GNJZ
Departure: Montreal - Trudeau International Airport (YUL), Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Arrival: LaGuardia Airport (LGA), New York, New York, United States
Accident: Collision with airport rescue firefighting vehicle upon landing
What happened - from the preliminary report
On 22 March 2026, at 23:37 Eastern Daylight Time, Jazz Aviation flight 646, operating as Air Canada flight 8646, a CRJ-900 airplane, collided with Rescue 35 (R35), an Oshkosh Striker 1500 aircraft rescue firefighting (ARFF) vehicle, while landing on runway 4 at LaGuardia Airport (LGA), arriving from Montreal - Trudeau International Airport (YUL).
The Captain and First Officer were killed. Of the 2 flight attendants, 72 passengers and 2 crew of the ARFF vehicle, 39 were transported to local hospitals with 6 serious injuries reported.
The NTSB notes that the airplane's cockpit voice recorder (CVR), Flight Data recorder (FDR) and quick access recorder were recovered and downloaded at the NTSB's laboratory in Washington DC. Exterior light bulbs and some avionics units were removed from the airplane and sent to NTSB laboratories. R35's vehicle data recorder, engine control module and situational display were also retained for future download.
The below information is a timeline of events and is summarised in Table 1.
The NTSB reviewed aircraft and ARFF vehicle tracking data, ATC and airplane CVR audio recordings, airplane FDR information, as well as surveillance footage which revealed that prior to the accident, 6 ARFF response vehicles (4 ARFF trucks, a tool truck and an airstair truck) and one Port Authority police vehicle were responding to an emergency that was declared at 23:31:42 near Terminal B.
At 23:35:07, the ATC local controller (tower controller), cleared Jazz flight 646 to land on runway 4. At this time the aircraft was on a 5 mile final at an altitude of around 1900 feet.
At 23:35:28, the accident ARFF vehicle (R35) left the fire station area with the other six vehicles. At this time, Jazz flight 646 was about 1.6 nautical miles from taxiway D and at an altitude of around 1500 feet.
The vehicles initially gathered near the intersections of taxiways BB and D. The intended path was to continue on taxiway D, cross runway 4, and then proceed to the destination which was the emergency that was declared near Terminal B.
At 23:35:47, the tool truck (which has callsign 'Truck 7', and was planned to be the lead vehicle) crew attempted to call LGA ATC Tower. However, a simultaneous radio transmission on the same frequency obscured Truck 7's radio call. R35 entered taxiway BB and another airplane which had already landed on runway 4, crossed taxiway D. At this time, Jazz flight 646 was about 3.7 nautical miles from taxiway D and at an altitude of about 1180 feet.
At 23:36:21, Truck 7 tried again to contact the tower. Before ATC responded, Truck 7 coordinated with R35 (which had callsign 'Truck 1') to contact the tower. At this time, Jazz flight 646 was about 2.3 nautical miles from taxiway D and at an altitude of around 650 feet.
At 23:36:44, the local controller asked which vehicle needed to cross the runway. At the same time, Truck 1 moved to the front of the waiting response vehicles at the intersection of taxiway BB and D. At this time, Jazz flight 646 was about 1.5 nautical miles away from taxiway D and at an altitude of 400 feet.
At 23:36:51, the red runway entrance lights (RELs) illuminated for the intersection of runway 4 and taxiway D. At this time, Jazz flight 646 was about 1.2 nautical miles from taxiway D and at an altitude of 287 feet. Truck 1 was stopped on taxiway D about 460 feet from the edge of runway 4.
At 23:36:56, Truck 1's crew replied to ATC with "Truck 1 and company", and the local controller acknowledged. Truck 1 then requested Truck 1 and company to cross runway 4 at taxiway D, and ATC instructed them to cross.
At 23:37:04, the aircraft was at an altitude of about 130 feet and about a quarter mile on final approach, about 4,400 feet away from taxiway D.
At 23:37:07, Truck 1's crew read back the clearance and began moving along taxiway D towards runway 4. At this time, Jazz flight 646 was about 3700 feet from taxiway D and at an altitude of 87 feet.
At 23:37:11, Jazz flight 646 crossed the threshold of runway 4. At this time, the truck was travelling at a speed of 10 knots (11.5 mph) and about 410 feet from the edge of runway 4.
At 23:37:12, the local controller gave taxi instructions to another aircraft and immediately afterward instructed Truck 1 to stop, as the Truck was crossing taxiway AA. Truck 1's speed continued to increase. At this time, Jazz flight 646 was about 2500 feet from taxiway D and at an altitude of 30 feet with a ground speed of 133 knots.
At 23:37:17, the airplane's main landing gear touched down about 1000 feet from taxiway D at a ground speed of 128 knots. At this time there was a transfer of control from the First Officer to the Captain. At that time, Truck 1 had crossed the hold short line at a speed of about 24 mph.
At 23:37:20, the local controller again instructed Truck 1 to stop. At this time, the airplane's brake application began and thrust reversers were deployed. Truck 1 was just over 100 feet from entering runway 4 and travelling at a speed of about 29 mph.
At 23:37:21, the REL's extinguish.
At 23:37:22, about 2 seconds before the collision, the airplane's nose landing gear touched down while the aircraft was about 400 feet from taxiway D and travelling with a ground speed of 106 knots. At this time, Truck 1 was travelling at a speed of 30 mph and just entering runway 4.
Truck 1 turned toward the left just prior to the collision. The airplane's rudder deflected about 6 degrees to the left just prior to the end of the flight recorder data. The collision occurred at the intersection of taxiway D and runway 4. The airplane's last recorded ground speed before the collision was 90 knots.
Table 1: Table showing aircraft distance and altitude at different times as well as what occured at each time
Time (local time) | Airplane Distance from taxiway D | Airplane Altitude in feet | Comments |
23:31:42 | An emergency is declared near Terminal B and ARFF vehicles respond, including the accident ARFF vehicle. | ||
23:35:07 | 1500 | Jazz flight 646 is on a 5 mile final and is cleared to land on runway 4 | |
23:35:28 | 4.6nm | 1500 | The accident ARFF vehicle left the fire station area |
23:35:47 | 3.7nm | 1180 | Truck 7 attempted to call LGA Tower |
23:36:21 | 2.3nm | 650 | |
23:36:44 | 1.5nm | 400 | |
23:36:51 | 1.2nm | 287 | The red runway entrance lights (RELs) illuminate |
23:36:56 | Truck 1 and company requests to cross runway 4 at taxiway D. ATC instructs them to cross | ||
23:37:04 | 0.25nm on final approach, about 4400 feet | 130 | |
23:37:07 | 3700 feet | 87 | The ARFF vehicles begin moving along taxiway D towards runway 4 |
23:37:11 | Jazz flight 646 crossed the threshold of runway 4. Truck 1 was 410 feet from the edge of runway 4 | ||
23:37:12 | 2550 feet | 30 | Aircraft had a ground speed of 133 knots. ATC instructs Truck 1 to stop |
23:37:17 | 1450 feet | Aircraft's main landing gear touches down | Aircraft has a ground speed of 128 knots. Truck 1 crosses the hold short line with a speed of 24mph |
23:37:20 | 0 | ATC instructs Truck 1 to stop. Trcuk 1 was about 100 feet from entering runway 4 and had a speed of 29mph | |
23:37:21 | RELs extinguish | ||
23:37:22 (about 2 seconds before the collision) | 400 feet | Aircraft's nose landing gear touches down | Aircraft had a ground speed of 106 knots. Truck 1 was travelling at 30mph and just entering runway 4 |
23:37:24 | Collision. The aircraft's last recorded ground speed was 90 knots |
Evacuation
The airplane came to rest adjacent to taxiway B, between taxiways D and E, upright on a magnetic heading of about 28 degrees. Initially it was in a nose down attitude, due to the crush damage and partial separation of the forward fuselage and the nose landing gear. Truck 1 came to rest northwest of the aircraft, on its left side, on a magnetic heading of about 206 degrees.
Passengers self evacuated through the four over wing exits. The ground vehicles redirected from the emergency at Terminal B to the accident airplane, and ARFF personnel assisted with the evacuation. During the evacuation, the airplane tilted nose upward until the tail contacted the ground.
Interviews of ARFF members and aft flight attendant
The preliminary report states that multiple members of the ARFF team were interviewed. The report highlights that there were no recordings available for inter-ARFF communications. The driver of Truck 7 reported hearing ATC clearing Truck 1 and company to cross runway 4. Shortly after, she saw the airplane and announced "stop stop stop" on the radio. The turret operator in Truck 1 recalled hearing the words "stop stop stop" on the tower frequency but he did not know who the transmission was intended for. He then heard "Truck 1 stop stop stop" and realized it was for them and subsequently noticed that they had entered the runway. He further recalled as they turned left, he saw the airplane's lights on the runway. The airplane's CVR captured the communications between Truck 1 and the local controller that were transmitted on the local controller frequency, including the request and clearance to cross runway 4.
The at flight attendant reported getting in the aft jump seat for landing and described the flight as normal until he felt an impact and jar. He did not know what had happened and attempted to call the pilots but received no response. He reported that conditions were dark, but passengers deplaned orderly through all exits. He stayed with 4 passengers in front of the airplane until ARFF entered and assisted him and the remaining passengers ti the exits.
Debris field
The preliminary report states that the debris field was surveyed using drone imagery, GPS location and photography. The airplane and truck were scanned with a 3 dimensional laser measurement system. The runway was examined to document the witness marks sustained during the accident sequence. The report states that the wreckage path was about 300 feet long and 150 feet wide on a magnetic heading of 65 degrees.
Airplane examination
The preliminary report also discusses the aircraft examination. The examination revealed that the most severe damage was forward of passenger seat row number 1. Crash damage extended from the nose to about wardrobe number 2 on the left side of the cabin and to about the forward lavatory on the right side. The two pilot seats, an unoccupied flight deck observer seat, and the forward flight attendant seat were separated from the airplane and found in the debris to the northeast of Truck 1.
All passenger seats remained intact and secured to their attachment points. Seats 1A and 2A had inboard sidewall and seat leg deformation while the remainder of the passenger seats received minor or no damage.
The preliminary report states that there were no anomalies found with the pitch, roll, or yaw flight control surfaces. The leading edge slats and trailing edge flaps were found in their fully extended positions. All 8 spoilers were found in the retracted position but a review of the FDR data revealed that the ground spoilers activated about six seconds before the end of the recording. Both thrust reversers were in the fully deployed position.
ARFF Truck examination
The NTSB also examined the ARFF truck. The R35 truck had substantial damage to the right side body structure and equipment storage compartments. The 1500 gallon water tank was fragmented and all the water was released. Additionally, the 210 gallon foam tank was largely in tact, though breached, and all the foam was released. The right side body structure had a semicircular indentation in the inboard direction, just forward of the right rear wheel. The preliminary report notes that the operator cab was largely undamaged.
Flight crew schedule, pairing and experience
The accident occurred on the first day of a four day trip for the flight deck crew. The first day had three flights with the accident flight being the last scheduled flight. The first flight was from Montreal (YUL) to Quebec City (YQB). The second flight was from YQB to YUL. The third flight was from YUL to LGA. The crew flew together one other time on February 11 2026 when they flew two round trips to YUL and YQB.
The Captain was the Pilot in Command. The captain was hired in December 2022 and became a Captain in December 2025. The Captain had a total of 3560 flight hours with 1600 hours at Jazz.
The First Officer was hired in April 2024. The First Officer had 718 flight hours with 435 hours at Jazz.
ARFF crew schedule and experience
The driver of Truck 1 had three years of ARFF experience and had been on duty for about 5.5 hours while on a 12 hour shift.
The turret operator had 12 years of ARFF experience and had been on duty for about 4.5 hours, while on a 12 hour shift.
ATC controllers schedule and experience
The preliminary report states that there were two controllers on duty in the tower at the time of the accident. The preliminary report highlights that this was consistent with the mid-shift basic watch schedule. Both controllers were qualified and current on all control positions at LGA.
The local controller had 18 years of experience and was responsible, in part, for the arrival and departure of aircraft on assigned runways, aircraft operating within assigned airspace and all runway surfaces. At the time of the accident, the local controller had been on position for about 42 minutes.
The ground controller was also the controller in charge and had about 19 years of experience. The ground controller was responsible, in part, to taxi aircraft on a first come, first serve basis. As circumstances permitted, the ground controller ensured that the Instrument Landing System critical areas were protected, sequenced departure aircraft, provided guidance and goals for the shift, monitored and managed traffic volume and flow. At the time of the accident, the ground controller had been on position for about 51 minutes.
Before the accident, the ground controller had been coordinating ground operations with an airplane that had performed 2 rejected takeoffs, followed by a ground emergency at Terminal B, which included communicating with the airplane that declared the emergency, ramp operations, and ARFF. As the ground controller continued to coordinate the emergency, the local controller took over transmitting ATC instructions on both the ground controller and local controller radio frequencies.
Airport surface detection and runway status lights
The preliminary report states that the airport was equipped with an Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X), which was a surface surveillance system used by ATC to track surface movement of aircraft and ground vehicles. The system collected data from surface surveillance radar, multiliterate sensors, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) sensors, Mode S transponders, and terminal automation systems. It fused this information into a display in the control tower, allowing controllers to see the real time positions of aircraft and vehicles on the airport surface, even in low visibility.
There were multiple ASDE-X displayed in the control tower. ASDE-X provides visual and aural alerts when it detects potential runway incursions or conflicts, giving controllers the ability to intervene before an accident occurs. However, a review of the ASDE-X system data by the FAA determined that the system did not generate an aural or visual alert on the ASDE-X displays in the LGA tower to warn controllers of the potential runway conflict.
Multiple ground vehicles, none of which were equipped with transponders, were intermittently detected as radar targets, while holding on taxiway D at taxiway BB. However, due to their close and varying proximity to each other, and the intermittent merging and unmerging of radar targets, the ASDE-X was unable to establish high confidence tracks.
At the time of the accident, accident, ASDE-X only displayed two targets on taxiway D instead of seven distinct targets at their respective locations. Without transponder equipped vehicles, the ASDE-X system could not uniquely identify each of the seven responding vehicles or reliably determine their positions or tracks. As a result, the system could not correlate the track of the airplane with the track of Truck 1 and did not predict a potential conflict with the landing aircraft.
LGA Airport is one of twenty airports in the United States equipped with runway status light (RWSLs) system, which provides aircraft and ground vehicle operators with a real time warning about potential conflicts at runway/taxiway intersections. It includes RELs installed at most taxiway/runway intersections, which illuminate red to warn taxiway traffic whenever runway traffic is approaching the intersection. These lights are located along taxiway centerlines from the hold short lines to the runway edges with another on the runway centerline. They are focused away from the runway, so that when activated, they are visible to traffic on the taxiway approaching the runway.
These red lights are off when no runway traffic is approaching an intersection. They are automatically activated by the ASDE-X system when an aircraft is approaching the runway for landing, or preparing for takeoff. As a landing aircraft approaches the runway, the RELs at each intersection simultaneously illuminate to warn potential crossing traffic about the landing airplane. After an airplane touches down, the RELs turn off at each taxiway sequentially, as the aircraft progresses down the runway. The system is designed to turn the lights off about 2 - 3 seconds before the aircraft reaches each intersection.
The preliminary report notes that a review of surveillance footage revealed that the RELs illuminated for the arrival of the accident aircraft, as Truck 1 and company were stationary abut 300 feet from the runway. The RELs on taxiway D remained illuminated until about the time Truck 1 reached the edge of the runway, when hey extinguished, about 3 seconds before the collision.
Truck 1 was equipped with a situational awareness display which depicted the location of the truck as well as other ground vehicles and aircraft. It could provide both visual and aural alerts when approaching runways but it could not detects or warn of impending collisions.
Meteorology
The preliminary report states that the runway was considered wet or contaminated for landing purposes. A field condition report for runway 4 indicated good braking action along the entire runway.
At 22:51, about 46 minutes before the accident, the automated weather station at LGA included a visibility of 7 statute miles in light rain, with scattered clouds at 6000 feet and an overcast layer at 9500 feet.
The next weather observation occurred at 23:51, about 14 minutes after the accident. This report included visibility of 4 statute miles in light rain and mist, with few clouds at 4500 feet and an overcast layer at 11000 feet.
Aftermath of the accident
In the aftermath of the accident, Michael Rousseau, the CEO of Air Canada was criticized for posting an official corporate video on X expressing condolences almost entirely in English with French subtitles, rather than posting a second video in French. In response, Rousseau announced that he would retire later in 2026.
Additionally, on 13 May 2026, the FAA stated that they would begin equipping its approximately 1900 vehicles with transponders to help ATC track and identify them on runways and taxiways. Vehicle Movement Area Transmitters (VMATS) track vehicles at airports that have surface surveillance systems. The FAA had been planning this project for several months but accelerated it after this accident.
About the aircraft
The aircraft was a CRJ-900 which was delivered new to the airline in 2005.
The Bombardier CRJ is a family of regional jets introduced by Bombardier Aerospace in 1991. The CRJ program was acquired by Japanese corporation, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in 2020. The CRJ-900 has different variants including the CRJ-900 baseline variant, the CRJ-900ER and the CRJ-900LR. The baseline CRJ-900 has a maximum takeoff weight of 36500kg and a range of 1350 nautical miles.
About Air Canada Express/Jazz Aviation
Air Canada Express is a brand name of regional feeder flights for Air Canada that are subcontracted to other airlines, such as Jazz Aviation.
Jazz is a regional Canadian airline. Jazz Aviation provides regional and charter airline services in Canada and the United States, primarily to Air Canada using the brand name Air Canada Express. Under a capacity purchase agreement, Air Canada sets the Jazz route network and flight schedule, and purchases all of Jazz's seat capacity based on predetermined rates.
Similar accidents
Research revealed at least one other occurrence of an airplane colliding with an ARFF vehicle.
On 18 November 2022, LATAM Airlines Peru flight 2213, operated by an Airbus A320neo, collided with a fire engine during its takeoff roll, killing two firefighters. The aircraft was damaged and was written off, making it the first hull loss of the A320neo family.
On this day, the aircraft started its takeoff roll at Jorge Chavez International Airport in Lima when during the takeoff roll, multiple aircraft crash tenders and fire engines on a planned emergency drill crossed the runway in front of the accelerating aircraft. The pilots rejected the takeoff but still ended up hitting one of the firetrucks.
The aircraft's right engine separated and the right main landing gear collapsed.
The final report concluded that the crash was the result of ARFF vehicles entering the runway without express permission while conducting an emergency drill. The drill was poorly planned with poor communication between the relevant parties including the use of non standard terminology.
Clearly the preliminary report has provided an insight into what we know so far and will provide investigators a direction in which to take this investigation. Although the death of the two pilots is devastating, the aftermath of this accident shows why aviation continues to be the safest form of travel as the FAA is already working to equip its airport vehicles with transponders in order to prevent an accident like this from happening again.
Feel free to share your thoughts by leaving a comment below, on our group discusion page or on our social media. You can also contact us by emailing Av Geek Blog or by using the contact form.
Further Reading
NTSB Preliminary Report - Jazz Aviation, Air Canada Express Flight 8646 Collides with Fire Truck on LaGuardia Runway
Thank you for reading.
X: avgeek_blog
Instagram: avgeek_blog
Email: geekofairlines@gmail.com
Date Published: 19 May 2026