Alaska Airlines door plug blow out - 2 years later
- Av Geek Blog
- Jan 24
- 7 min read
On 5th January 2024 an Alaska Airlines 737 MAX 9 experienced an inflight separation of the mid exit door (MED) plug and a rapid depressurization during climb after taking off from Portland International Airport. One flight attendant and seven passengers received minor injuries.
The NTSB has investigated this accident and the final report was published on 24th June 2025.
In this blog post, I will take a look at what we know about this accident, based on the preliminary and final NTSB reports. I will examine what happened during the flight, the investigation and its findings as well as the safety recommendations that resulted from this investigation.
Click here to read my March 2024 blog post about this incident and what we knew at the time from the preliminary report.
You can also read the full NTSB report by accessing it from their website.
What happened on flight AS1282? A brief summary.
Date: 5th January 2024
Aircraft type: Boeing 737 MAX 9
Aircraft registration: N704AL
Flight number: AS1282
Departure airport: Portland (PDX)
Scheduled arrival airport: Ontario, Ca (diverted back to PDX)
Departure time: 17:06 (local time)
On 5th January 2024, a Boeing 737 MAX 9, operated by Alaska Airlines as flight AS1282 experienced an inflight separation of the left mid exit door (MED) plug and a rapid depressurization. This occurred while the aircraft was at an altitude of about 14,830 feet and climbing after takeoff from PDX. The aircraft returned to PDX and landed safely.
The aircraft had a hole in the fuselage where the MED plug had been installed. The final report by the NTSB notes that components on the fuselage frame that surrounded the hole were damaged. The report also notes that the passenger seats and cabin interior nearest the hole were damaged and that a seat back tray table, two seat headrests and cabin interior panels were missing. The report notes that some pieces were located but other components, including four bolts that would secure the left MED plug from moving upward were not found.
The flight
The accident flight was the first leg of the captain and first officer's one day pairing for a round trip from PDX to ONT. The first officer performed the external pre flight walk around and observed nothing abnormal except ice on the wing. The first officer called for an ice check and the airplane was deiced.
The captain was the pilot flying and the report states that the flights taxi, takeoff and initial climb were uneventful.
The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data showed that, at 17:12:13, the airplane was climbing through about 14,830 feet when the cabin pressure dropped, and the cabin altitude warning activated, followed one second later by the master caution alert.
According to the captain, he heard a "loud bang" and his ears popped, his head was "pushed" forward, and his communications headset was pushed nearly off. The first officer stated that her ears popped and that the flight deck door blew open, her headset blew off, and the cabin altitude warning horn sounded.
The captain then asked the first officer to declare an emergency with ATC and request a lower altitude.
The captain disconnected the autopilot and auto throttle and began to descend to 10,000 feet and called for the rapid depressurization checklist.
FDR data showed that at 17:13:41, the airplane reached its maximum altitude of 16,320 feet and then began to descend.
The captain and first officer had already briefed before takeoff that if they had a problem, they would return to runway 28L and had the localizer and radio frequencies already set up.
The FDR data showed that the flight landed at 17:26:14, about 14 minutes after the MED plug separated from the aircraft. The report states that the landing, rollout and taxi to the gate were uneventful.
About the aircraft
The accident aircraft was a Boeing 737 MAX 9 with registration N704AL. Alaska Airlines took delivery of the accident airplane from Boeing on 31st October 2023, and placed it into service on 11th November 2023. After the accident flight, the aircraft was returned to Boeing.
What is a Mid Exit Door Plug?
A Mid Exit Door (MED) plug is a rectangular airframe structure, about 29 inches wide and 59 inches high, that is installed in a fuselage opening and secured in place by bolts and other hardware.
Why do some aircraft have a MED plug?
As noted in my March 2024 blog post, only some aircraft have a door plug.
Aircraft have strict regulations about seating capacity and emergency exits and passengers must be able to evacuate the aircraft within 90 seconds using half of the available emergency exits. Therefore, in dense seating configurations of the 737 MAX 9, there is a mid-cabin exit door aft of the wings and before the rear cabin doors, in order to meet these evacuation requirements. However, the door can be deactivated if the cabin does not have a denser seating configuration. On the Alaska Airlines aircraft involved in this incident, the extra exit door was not needed as the high-density seating configuration was not used. The extra door was not activated and permanently 'plugged'. From the inside, it would be impossible to tell that there was a door plug present as the door plug looks just like the interior wall panel in the rest of the aircraft.
The investigation
After the incident, the NTSB carried out an investigation.
The missing left MED plug, seat 26A seatback tray, seat 25A headrest, and pieces of the interior sidewalls were located on the ground along the airplane's flight path and recovered.
The NTSB investigation found that the four bolts that secured the left MED plug to stop it moving upwards were missing before the aircraft was delivered to Alaska Airlines. This meant that the MED plug was able to move gradually upwards during previous flights, until, during the accident flight, the MED plug moved upwards enough to separate from its stop fittings and separate in flight.
The NTSB determined that when the airplane was manufactured, Boeing employees had opened the MED plug without experienced personnel present. Additionally, no paperwork was found that stated that the MED plug had been removed.
The NTSB also noted that Boeing's on the job training was insufficient and that certain FAA systems were deficient and not able to identify discrepancies for parts removals or human error.
Probable cause
The NTSB highlights that the probable cause of the accident was the inflight separation of the left MED plug due to the failure of Boeing to provide proper training and oversight that was needed to ensure that manufacturing personnel could correctly comply with the company's parts removal process. The NTSB also highlights that the FAA's compliance enforcement surveillance and audit planning activities failed to ensure that Boeing addressed issues associated with its parts removal process.
Safety recommendations
As a result of the investigation, the NTSB made safety recommendations to the FAA and Boeing.
Some of these recommendations include:
The FAA to revise its compliance enforcement surveillance system, audit planning activities and records systems to ensure that they provide the necessary functionality for inspectors overseeing production.
For Boeing to continue the certification process for the design enhancement for MED plugs to ensure that all new aircraft are equipped with the enhancement. It was also recommended for Boeing to issue a service bulletin to address retrofitting in service aircraft and for the FAA to issue an airworthiness directive to require that all MED plug equipped aircraft be retrofitted with the design enhancement.
For Boeing to revise its Business Process Instruction (BPI) for parts removal to include clear guidance and ensure that a removal record is generated when required.
For Boeing to develop a structured on the job training program to identify necessary tasks for manufacturing personnel.
For Boeing to revise its safety risk management process to ensure it identifies the root causes of compliance issues.
For Boeing to develop a process that can identify escapes that result from human error.
For the FAA to require a Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) capable of recording the last 25 hours of audio.
The publication of the final NTSB report may mean that the investigation into this incident has been finished but in aviation safety always comes first and it will be interesting to see how many, if any, of the NTSB safety recommendations will be put into place.
Alaska Airlines flight 1282 was a sobering reminder that aviation safety is built on thousands of invisible decisions - and that even a single lapse can have dramatic consequences. The real legacy of this accident may lie in the reforms it forces - stronger manufacturing discipline, tougher regulatory enforcement and renewed respect for engineering rigor.
For Boeing, rebuilding trust after this accident won't come from press releases alone - it will require measurable, long-term changes in how safety is prioritized over speed and cost. In the two years since this accident, airlines have still placed orders for Boeing aircraft - often very substantial orders, showing that airlines do still trust Boeing to deliver quality aircraft.
While Alaska Airlines flight 1282 exposed serious weaknesses, it also demonstrates the strength of modern aviation safety systems and the remarkable flight crew and air traffic controllers who safely dealt with this accident flight.
Alaska Airlines flight 1282 will likely be remembered as a pivotal moment in modern aviation, not because of what went wrong, but because of what it revealed. The explosive decompression exposed deep vulnerabilities in manufacturing oversight and quality assurance, while also reminding us how close even advanced systems can come to failure.
Yet the accident also underscored the resilience of the broader safety framework - from the crew's calm response to the investigation that followed. If meaningful reforms come from this event, flight AS1282 may ultimately serve as a catalyst for a safer, more accountable aviation industry. The real test now is whether lessons learned are translated into lasting changes.
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Date published: 24 January 2026
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